Despite their differences, Kantian and Hegelian idealisms can be summarized as philosophical accounts,
which address and answer why we act, judge, and live freely and morally with reasons.
For Kant, practical reason enables the individual subject to frame maxims as lawful and, in so doing,
becomes the target of evaluation in characterizing (a) autonomy as the source of obligation and (b)
rational motivation as the impetus for making obligation or, specifically, duty for duty's sake morally
worthy despite being unknowable yet indubitable.
For Hegel, the achievement of spirit as conscience enables duty for duty's sake, as an outcome of
"absolute freedom" under the moral point of view, to be known but never indubitably in actions and deeds
via recognition. It becomes the target of evaluation in characterizing (a) the moral worthiness of obligation
as being in unison with an achievable satisfaction and (b) such satisfaction as reliant on the reason-giving
and reason-sharing explanation, justification, and motivation in others' interpretation of actions and deeds
exemplifying obligation.